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Abstract
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human interac-
tion. For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others,
and this has strategic consequences. Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS)
develop a formal framework where frustration and anger affect interaction and shape
economic outcomes. This paper designs an experiment testing the predictions based on
central concepts of their theory. The focus is on situations where other-responsibility
is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I find only limited support for the
theory: While unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs seem to generate nega-
tive emotions in subjects, which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization of frustration,
behavior is generally not affected by these emotions to the extent predicted by the
theory.
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1 Introduction
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, with important consequences for human interaction.
For example, angry individuals may become hostile in their dealings with others, which
could shape interaction and outcomes in, for example, situations involving negotiation and
bargaining, contractual holdup, delegated decision making, conflict, and social dilemmas.1
Although it seems important to understand the sources of anger, as well as its con-
sequences for strategic interaction, this topic has received relatively little attention in the
development of behavioral theory.2 Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; henceforth,
BDS) contribute to fill this gap in the literature by developing a theory where frustration
and anger affect interaction and outcomes, using the framework of psychological game theory
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009). The objective of my paper is to
investigate the empirical relevance of BDS, and to this end I design an experiment that tests
the predictions based on central concepts of their theory. This constitutes the first empirical
test of BDS.
In BDS, anger is anchored in frustration, which is the result of unfulfilled expectations
about material payoffs.3 Frustration sometimes makes players hostile toward their co-players.
When frustrated, a player may go after other players, but his desire to do so depends on his
evaluation of the other players’ part in the outcome that frustrates him. BDS develop three
different versions of how this evaluation process shapes the actions of frustrated players: With
simple anger, frustrated players are angry with anyone, regardless of the source of frustration;
with anger from blaming behavior, players are targeted only if they caused frustration; and
with anger from blaming intentions, players are targeted only if they intended to cause
frustration.
With this paper I develop empirical tests for two key features of the theory: simple anger
and anger from blaming behavior. Simple anger (BDS’ first anger hypothesis) formalizes a
version of the classical Dollard et al. frustration-aggression-displacement hypothesis, where
aggression through a displacement effect is directed at substitute targets (Dollard et al., 1939;
Berkowitz, 1989). Such displaced aggression could be relevant when the source of frustration
1For empirical accounts of negative emotions and anger in similar situations, see e.g., Pillutla and
Murnighan (1996), Sanfey et al. (2003), Bosman and van Winden (2002), Bolle et al. (2014), Hopfensitz
and Reuben (2009), and Drouvelis and Grosskopf (2014).
2This is especially true for the analysis of immediate (as opposed to anticipated) emotions, which focuses
on the “action tendency” of emotions experienced by the decision maker (e.g., Elster, 1998; Loewenstein,
2000).
3This is based on the notion of frustration as an obstruction to reaching a desired outcome, which is
a common conceptualization in psychology; see, e.g., BDS or Potegal and Stemmler (2010) for details and
discussion. For alternative ways to model anger, see, e.g., Akerlof (2015) who focuses on rule violations as a
source of anger.
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is intangible, as in the case of an unexpected loss suffered by a local soccer team, which
has been associated with substantial increases in domestic violence and violent crime (Card
and Dahl, 2011; Munyo and Rossi, 2013). Dramatic changes in weather and climate could
have a similar effect, for instance through strong and correlated income shocks as a source of
frustration and anger.4 With anger from blaming behavior (BDS’ second anger hypothesis),
frustrated individuals are angry with those who caused frustration through their behavior.
Vis-a`-vis simple anger, a key ingredient for anger from blaming behavior is the importance
of blame attribution and other-responsibility;5 and vis-a`-vis anger from blaming intentions,
anger from blaming behavior is more relevant if people focus more on what they can observe
(and expect to observe) rather than on intentions, which in many situations are more difficult
to discern.
BDS create a rich framework for theoretical analysis. It is, however, quite challenging to
develop convincing empirical tests of the theory, partly because people’s behavior is shaped
both by the emotions they experience themselves and by their anticipation of others’ behav-
ior due to the emotions they might experience (it is a psychological game where subjects
have belief-dependent utility functions), and partly also because the different versions of the
theory may predict similar behavioral patterns in a given situation of interest. Therefore,
the empirical strategy in the present paper is to lift up, focus on, and compare key features
of the theory in a condensed and specific setting, as simply as possible. The experimental
treatments are built around the following situation: A player who had a good chance to earn
100 Swedish kronor (about 12 US dollars at the time of writing) finds himself with only 10
kronor. Is he frustrated? Theory suggests he might be, since he has been obstructed from
reaching a desired outcome. Would he punish a passive co-player, who had no chance at
all to prevent the misfortune? Simple anger suggests he might. Would he punish an active
co-player, who made a “bad” choice in a binary lottery and thereby caused the misfortune?
Anger from blaming behavior suggests he might.
I develop specific empirical tests for simple anger and anger from blaming behavior.
The tests are quite extreme in that they focus on relatively unsophisticated behavior, such
as Pareto-damaging punishment of passive co-players. Theoretically, simple anger is widely
applicable to situations involving sophisticated strategic interaction, but the conceptual basis
is quite rudimentary: I hit my head on the kitchen shelf and therefore I punish you; I hit my
thumb with a hammer and therefore I punish you; or you bring me bad news and therefore
I punish you (Frijda, 1993). Focusing on this aspect seems natural for a first empirical
4See, e.g., Burke et al. (2015) and Ranson (2014) for a discussion and empirical evidence on climate and
interpersonal violence.
5See, e.g., Averill (1983), Smith and Ellsworth (1985), and Wranik and Scherer (2010) for a discussion on
the role of blame attribution in anger.
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test of the theory. Moreover, while anger from blaming behavior admits more sophisticated
reasoning (about co-players’ blameworthiness), it too can be quite rudimentary. For example,
it admits punishment for mistakes or bad luck. Gurdal et al. (2013) document behavior that
is consistent with this aspect of anger from blaming behavior. In their experiment, an agent
invests money on behalf of a principal. The agent chooses between a safe and a risky prospect,
and the principal subsequently decides on remuneration for the agent and a dummy player.
Interestingly and in line with anger from blaming behavior, Gurdal et al. find that agents
are paid less (relative to the dummy player) following bad realizations of the risky prospect,
i.e., they are punished for bad uncontrollable luck.6 Building on these insights, I specifically
test whether aspects of blame, frustration, and punishment in BDS are relevant in situations
where other-responsibly is weak or nonexistent. The focus of the paper is thus on emotion
and behavior at one end of a spectrum, where there is complete payoff symmetry between
players (i.e., no economic inequality) and where frustration is caused by chance moves or bad
luck rather than harmful actions with blameworthy intent.
Results from the experiment indicate that unfulfilled expectations about material pay-
offs generate negative emotions in subjects, which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization
of frustration. However, these negative emotions do not generally affect subjects’ behavior
to the extent predicted by the theory. The experiment focuses on situations where other-
responsibility is weak or nonexistent, and in this specific context I do not find much support
for the simple anger hypothesis or the anger from blaming behavior hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes relevant aspects of BDS’
theory and illustrates the concepts of simple anger and anger from blaming behavior using
two examples. Section 3 describes and motivates the experimental design, which is based on
operationalized versions of these two examples, and derives hypotheses for the experiment.
The results are presented in Section 4, and in the final section I discuss the findings and
conclude the paper.
6On punishment for mistakes or bad luck, see also Cushman et al. (2009), Gino et al. (2010), and Bartling
and Fischbacher (2012); but cf. Rand et al. (2015). Furthermore, Mollerstrom et al. (2015) and Cappelen et
al. (2015) find that irrelevant or forced decisions affect how third-party spectators are willing to compensate
people for bad luck. In particular, Cappelen et al. (2015) implement an experiment where subjects are
allocated money based on a procedure that is very similar to the one used in the present paper, and they
find strong effects on redistribution decisions ex post. There is also a related literature on “outcome bias,”
which examines how negative uncontrollable outcomes affect how other persons are evaluated (e.g., Baron
and Hershey, 1988; Tan and Lipe, 1997).
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2 Frustration and anger
This section describes BDS’ theory (short version) using two examples to illustrate the con-
cepts of simple anger (Section 2.1) and anger from blaming behavior (Section 2.2). Later on,
these examples will be operationalized and implemented as the two main treatments in the
experiment (Section 3).
There are two players and two stages. Actions are represented by a sequence (at)t=1,2,
where at = (ati, a
t
j) and i 6= j. For instance, a1 represents the actions taken in the first stage
such that h = a1 is a history of length one, and a2i represents player i’s action in the second
stage. Conditional on a history of actions, i’s belief about his own action (which is interpreted
as his plan) and i’s belief about j’s action are given by αi. The material end-game payoff for
i depends on actions taken during the course of the game (a1 and a2) and is denoted pii.
Anger is anchored in frustration, which is a key aspect of the theory. It is the result
of unfulfilled expectations, i.e., when the best attainable outcome falls short of a person’s
expectation ex ante (which means that he was obstructed from reaching a desired outcome).
At t = 2, i’s frustration is given by
Fi(a
1;αi) =
[
E [pii;αi]−max
a2i
E
[
pii | (a1, a2i );αi
]]+
, (1)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. That is, it is the difference between the end-game payoff i expected
at t = 1 (first term) and the maximal end-game payoff i realizes that he can secure for himself
at t = 2 (second term). Frustration is thus the result of unexpected bad outcomes beyond
i’s control.
Frustration sometimes makes players hostile toward their co-player. When i is frustrated,
he may go after j, but his desire to do so depends on his evaluation of j’s part in the
outcome that frustrates him. BDS develop three different versions of how this evaluation
process shapes the actions of frustrated players: With simple anger (SA), player i is angry
with j regardless of the source of frustration; in contrast, with anger from blaming behavior
(ABB), player j will be targeted only if he caused i’s frustration, and with anger from
blaming intentions (ABI), player j will be targeted only if his intention was to frustrate i.
The behavior of player i moving at history h is determined by the following general utility
function:
Ui(h, ai;αi) = E [pii | (h, ai);αi]− θiBij(h;αi)E [pij | (h, ai);αi] , (2)
where θi ≥ 0 is a sensitivity parameter. When i is frustrated and under the impression it is
j’s fault (which is governed by the blame function Bij ∈ [0, Fi]), he will consider forgoing own
material payoff (pii) in order to reduce j’s payoff (pij). The formula in (2) thus implements
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punishment as the action tendency of frustration. The three versions of anger are separated
by the blame function Bij(h;αi), which determines what amount of frustration i attributes
to j, i.e., to what extent i blames j for his frustration. This function is always less than or
equal to i’s frustration, Fi(h;αi).
For simple anger, blame always equals frustration:
BSAij (h;αi) = Fi(h;αi). (3)
For anger from blaming behavior, i’s blame of j depends on j’s behavior. BDS consider
two different functional forms of the blame function for anger from blaming behavior: With
could-have-been blame, player i considers what “could have been” (at most) had j chosen
a different action, and with blaming unexpected deviations, player i considers instead the
material payoff he would have obtained had j behaved as i expected him to. The blame
function for the former, could-have-been blame, is:
BABBij (h;αi) = min
{[
max
h′≺h,a′j∈Aj(h′)
E
[
pii | (h′, a′j);αi
]− E [pii | h;αi]]+ , Fi(h;αi)} , (4)
thus capturing the difference between the maximal expected payoff j could have given i
through his action a′j (choosing from all possible actions Aj) at history h
′ (which precedes h)
and the payoff that i currently (at h) expects to secure for himself at the end of the game.
Turning to the latter functional form of the blame function for anger from blaming behavior,
blaming unexpected deviations, the blame function is instead:
BABBij (h;αi) = min

 ∑
h′≺h,a′j∈Aj(h′)
αij(a
′
j)E
[
pii | (h′, a′j);αi
]− E [pii | h;αi]
+ , Fi(h;αi)
 ,
(5)
such that i considers his expected payoff had j behaved as i expected (aij(a
′
j) is the marginal
probability with which i thinks that j chooses action a′j), and compares it with his current
expected payoff (second term).7
7With BDS’ third version of blame, anger from blaming intentions, i takes j’s intentions to frustrate i into
account: he compares the material payoff resulting from j’s action with the material payoff he thinks that j
thought would result from his action (blame thus depends on i’s belief about j’s belief about i’s action). I
don’t test this aspect of BDS’ theory and thus the interested reader is referred to BDS for formal treatment
and further discussion.
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2.1 A game with a correlated income shock
BDS illustrate the difference between blame modulated through simple anger and anger
from blaming behavior (and anger from blaming intentions) with an example (Figure 1). A
carpenter (Andy) and his co-worker (passive player Bob) are at work. On a good day (G),
they both earn a high wage of 2 and thus everything is fine. However, on the occasional
bad day (B) Andy accidentally hits his thumb with a hammer. He becomes frustrated and
may turn on his co-worker Bob (T ) even though he did not cause the upset, or, alternatively,
he accepts things as they are (N) and they can move on with their production. Chance
determines whether B or G prevails, with probability p and (1− p), respectively.
B (p)G (1− p)
2, 2
c
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
Figure 1: The simple anger game (“Hammering one’s thumb”)
The bad day thus comes with a correlated income shock, which frustrates Andy if the
maximal payoff at t = 2 (which is 1) is less than the payoff Andy expected at t = 1.
Frustration thus depends on p and on Andy’s belief at t = 1 about his own action in the
event of B, i.e., how he plans to react when frustrated due to B. In formal terms, Andy initially
expected to earn a material payoff of E [pia;αa] = 2(1−p)+αa(N |B)p, where αa(N |B) ∈ [0, 1]
is Andy’s plan for the bad day B, i.e., the probability with which he expects to choose N
should B occur. On the bad day B, the maximal payoff Andy can secure for himself (by
choosing a2a = N) is 1. Thus, using (1), his frustration at t = 2 is given by:
Fa(B;αa) = 2(1− p) + αa(N |B)p− 1 (6)
and it is increasing in αa(N |B) and also in −p, since this increases the payoff Andy initially
expects.
With simple anger, Andy might punish Bob for the frustrating outcome B. This is Pareto
damaging in terms of material payoffs but still preferable to Andy if he is sufficiently “prone
to anger” (which is determined by the sensitivity parameter θa in the utility function). Using
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(2), Andy’s utility from N is 1 − θa [2(1− p) + αa(N |B)p− 1] · 1, and his utility from T
is 0. Thus, Andy will punish Bob (by choosing T ) if θa is sufficiently large, since then
Ua(T ) ≥ Ua(N). In contrast, neither with anger from blaming behavior nor with anger from
blaming intentions does Andy blame Bob for B (so Bab = 0), because Bob had no possibility
to affect the outcome in the game. Hence, Andy will not punish Bob under these two versions
of the theory.
2.1.1 Equilibrium
BDS employ the notion of sequential equilibrium (SE) adapted to psychological games by
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009).8 The SE concept requires that action profiles are sequen-
tially rational, such that no gains can be made by deviating from planned actions, and that
beliefs are correct. In the game between Andy and Bob above, there are three types of
equilibria when frustration is modulated through simple anger (and p < 1/2):9
(i) If θa is large enough, Andy cares a lot about frustration and thus he will punish Bob
after B (a2a = T ). There is an SE with αa(N |B) = 0 and Ua(B, T ;αa) ≥ Ua(B,N ;αa),
such that θa ≥ 11−2p .
(ii) If θa is small enough, Andy does not care much about frustration and thus he will not
punish Bob after B (a2a = N). There is an SE with αa(N |B) = 1 and Ua(B, T ;αa) ≤
Ua(B,N ;αa), such that θa ≤ 11−p .
(iii) For a small intermediate interval of θa, Andy’s belief that he will punish Bob after B is
increasing in θa (i.e, in the extent to which he cares about frustration). There is an SE
with αa(N |B) = 1pθa−
1−2p
p
and Ua(B, T ;αa) = Ua(B,N ;αa), such that θa ∈ ( 11−p , 11−2p).
2.2 A game with a correlated income shock and some blame
In order to bring anger from blaming behavior into play and make it comparable with simple
anger, consider the following modification of the simple anger game displayed in Figure 1:
Chance moves L or R with probability (1−p) and p, respectively, and thereafter Bob chooses
between l and r without having observed the chance move. Bob’s choice leads to states
identical to B and G in the simple anger game, but whether l or r is the “good” choice that
8They explore a second solution concept, “polymorphic sequential equilibrium,” in order to develop a
different conceptualization of players’ intentions. A discussion of this concept is therefore beyond the scope
of this paper.
9We consider p < 1/2 since it may generate frustration. (When p ≥ 1/2, Andy will not be frustrated after
B and thus he will always choose N in this case.)
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leads to G depends on chance: l leads to G and r to B after L, and vice versa after R. The
game is displayed in Figure 2.
R (p)L (1− p)
c
rl
2, 2
r
2, 2
l
b
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
T
0, 0
N
1, 1
a
Figure 2: The blame-behavior game
For ease of comparison with the simple anger game, we restrict attention to situations
where p < 1/2. Andy’s frustration depends on his belief (at the root of the game) about
Bob’s plan, and we let αa(l) denote the probability with which Andy expects Bob to choose
l. If αa(l) = 1, Andy expects l with certainty and his plan for the bad day B is given by
αa(N |(R, l)), i.e., the probability with which he expects to choose N in the event of B. Andy’s
frustration on the bad day is thus given by Fa((R, l);αa) = 2(1− p) + αa(N |(R, l))p− 1 and
it is similar to frustration in the simple anger game, given by (6) above. The equation says
that if Andy expects l with certainty, his frustration after B is increasing in the probability
of L, i.e. the probability with which l leads to the good day G since this increases his ex-ante
expected payoff. With simple anger, there are then equilibria where αa(l) = 1 and, as in
the simple anger game above, (i) Andy with θa ≥ 11−2p punishes Bob after B, (ii) Andy with
θa ≤ 11−p does not punish Bob after B, and (iii) Andy with θa ∈ ( 11−p , 11−2p) is indifferent
between punishing and not punishing Bob after B.10
Bob moves before Andy and this opens for the possibility of Andy blaming and punishing
Bob in accordance with anger from blaming behavior. With could-have-been blame (first
version of anger from blaming behavior), predictions coincide with simple anger predictions.
The reason is that Andy blames Bob for frustrating him, since whenever the bad day occurs
it would have been avoided had Bob chosen differently. For example, if the bad day is due
to (R, l), it would have been avoided had Bob chosen r instead of l. Even though Bob from
10For Bob, l is optimal when p < 1/2 since it maximizes the chance of the good day G with the high payoff
(and, given Andy’s plan, Bob deviating would not affect Andy’s aggression on the bad day B).
9
an ex-ante perspective could not prevent the income shock (beyond choosing the action that
maximizes their chance of the good day G, which is l when p < 1/2), by (4) Andy fully blames
Bob for his frustration. In contrast, with blaming unexpected deviations (second version of
anger from blaming behavior), by (5) Andy would not blame Bob and therefore not punish
him after (R, l) if l is what he expected at the root of the game, and vice versa for (L, r)
if r is what he initially expected.11 This illustrates the difference between could-have-been
blame and blaming unexpected deviations, since only with the former is there an SE where
Bob is punished in the blame-behavior game.
In general, Andy is as frustrated on the bad day in the simple anger game (Figure 1)
as in the blame-behavior game (Figure 2). Since Bob is always blamed for the bad day in
the latter game using could-have-been blame, comparing across games we have exogenous
variation in the extent to which Bob can be blamed for a given level of frustration. Simple
anger is relevant in both games but anger from blaming behavior is relevant in only one of
them, and this constitutes the basic idea for the empirical strategy used in the present paper.
3 Experiment
3.1 Design
The main objective of this paper is to test condensed versions of simple anger and anger from
blaming behavior (could-have-been blame). To this end, I operationalize the simple anger
game (Figure 1) and the blame-behavior game (Figure 2) in two separate between-subject
treatments: a Simple treatment (Figure 3) and a Blame-behavior treatment (Figure 4).
Henceforth, Andy is called player a and Bob player b. Two important modifications are
made when operationalizing the games: First, since frustration in the bad state B originates
in a low p, I increase the outside payoff and set p = 1/2 in order to be able to implement the
games using the direct-response method rather than the strategy method (with a low p the
direct-response method would consume an unreasonable amount of observations). Therefore,
frustration in the experimental treatments originates in a high outside payoff rather than in a
low p. The choice of p at exactly 1/2 makes it as easy as possible for subjects to understand
and calculate their expected and counterfactual payoffs in each game. It also makes a’s
frustration in the blame-behavior game independent of his belief about b’s behavior, since
the bad state B is equally likely whether he chooses l or r (and conversely for the good state
11Of course, if Andy initially expected r but Bob deviated by choosing l, Andy would blame Bob for the
bad day occurring due to (R, l) since it would have been avoided had Bob behaved as Andy expected. This is
the basis for an SE where Andy expects r and Bob chooses r in order to deflect blame, even though l would
maximize the chance of the good day G when p < 1/2.
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G). This removes a potential source of bias in the comparison across the treatments, since
otherwise we would have to elicit and condition on a’s belief about b’s behavior in the Blame-
behavior treatment. A second modification is that the choice set of a is expanded to allow
for gradual punishment decisions. It is an implication of BDS that a sufficiently frustrated
player i will punish j as much as possible if he blames j for his frustration, and this is due
to the linearity of the utility function in (2). Interestingly, Bosman and van Winden (2002)
emphasize this aspect of emotional punishment in the context of their power-to-take game,
and with the modified choice set of a the experimental treatments admit investigation of this
aspect in the context of BDS’ theory.12
B (p = 1/2)G (p = 1/2)
100, 100
c
T
10− T, 10− T
a
Figure 3: The Simple treatment
A third treatment, Simple-strategy, implements the Simple treatment using the strategy
method, such that a decides on punishment in the event of the bad state, i.e., before knowing
whether B or G obtains (if B occurs the choice is implemented). An interesting aspect of
BDS is that preferences are own-plan dependent. In the simple anger game (Figure 1), this
means that a’s decision utility (2) at t = 2 depends on how he planned at t = 1 that he
would choose at t = 2. That is, a’s decision utility t = 2 depends on the probability with
which he expects (at t = 1) to choose N should B occur. If a plans to choose N , he becomes
more frustrated after B (since he plans to avoid costly punishment and thus expects a higher
material payoff) and thus more likely to choose T than had he instead planned to choose T
from the beginning. Thus, there is a potential conflict between a’s plan at t = 1 and his
action at t = 2, since at t = 1 he is not frustrated and thus wants to plan for N , which
maximizes his material end-game payoff, but at t = 2 he is frustrated and thus wants to
12In the power-to-take game, the first mover can appropriate part of the responder’s income but the
responder can retaliate by destroying some or all of his or her income. There seems to be a strong link
between negative emotions and appropriation and destruction behavior in this game, and also between
unfulfilled expectations and punishment, which is in line with BDS’ conceptualization of frustration (Bosman
and van Winden, 2002; Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007).
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(p = 1/2)(p = 1/2)
c
oddeven
100, 100
odd
100, 100
even
b
T
10− T, 10− T
a
T
10− T, 10− T
a
Figure 4: The Blame-behavior treatment
punish b if sufficiently prone to anger. In equilibrium, a takes this plan dependence into
account, making a plan that is consistent with him maximizing utility function (2) when
frustrated due to B.13 In light of this, the Simple-strategy treatment variation tests whether
a at the root of the game (in the Simple-strategy treatment) seems to have the same goal as
a has after the frustrating outcome B (in the Simple treatment).14
In a fourth and final treatment, Control, subjects participate in an experiment consisting
only of the subgame after B in the Simple treatment. The test of the theory (simple anger)
is not particularly strong based only on the Simple treatment since it rests on rejecting a
point prediction at the corner of the choice set, i.e., no punishment. One worry is that some
subjects could be influenced by experimenter-demand effects, especially since the game is
rather special. With a between-subjects comparison across Simple and Control, this potential
confound is avoided and the test of the theory becomes stronger.
3.2 Procedural details
Subjects are welcomed to the lab and randomly assigned a cubicle workstation. They are
given plenty of time to read the instructions (see Appendix) and ask questions (in private)
before the beginning of the experiment. They are matched in pairs but decisions are made
in private and they never learn the identity of the person they are matched with.
The end-game payoffs in the treatments are as follows (see also Figures 3 and 4): In
13This can for example be illustrated with the third SE mentioned on p. 8, where a plans for N after B
(with probability αa(N | B) = 1pθa −
1−2p
p ) so as to keep himself indifferent between N and T when frustrated
due to B.
14The between-subject test is in the spirit of BDS’ multi-self approach, with one “self” of i moving at each
history h of the game. See BDS and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, pp. 28) for details.
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the good situation G, a and b receive 100 Swedish kronor each (around 12 US dollars),
and in the bad situation B, they receive 10 Swedish kronor each and a decides whether
to accept the low payoff or punish b at a 1:1 cost. Thus, (pia, pib) = (100, 100) in G, and
(pia, pib) = (10− T, 10− T ) with a choosing T ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10} in B.
In the Simple treatment, the public toss of a six-sided die determines whether the good
situation G (with the high income) or bad situation B (with the low income) obtains for
any pair of subjects. Each subject-pair is given a group number at the beginning of the
experiment, and if there is an even-even or odd-odd match between the number shown on
the die and the group number, the subject-pair is assigned the good situation (with the high
income); in case of an even-odd or odd-even mismatch, the subject-pair is assigned the bad
situation (with the low income). For example, a subject-pair with group number 2 will be
assigned the good situation if the die shows 2, 4, or 6, and the bad situation for numbers 1, 3,
and 5. In contrast, in the Blame-behavior treatment, b will guess whether the die will show
an even or an odd number and if the guess is correct (an even-even or odd-odd match with the
number on the die), the good situation is assigned, and if the guess is wrong the bad situation
is assigned. Beyond this, everything is identical across the two treatments. In the Simple-
strategy treatment, subjects first make their decision (in the event of the bad situation) and
then the die toss determines what situation will be payoff relevant. In the Control treatment,
subjects immediately face a situation identical to the low-income situation in the other three
treatments.15
In the bad situation and in the Control treatment, b is asked for her belief about a’s
decision. If correct, b is monetarily rewarded. As a measure of frustration, subjects are
asked in a post-experimental questionnaire to describe the intensity of emotions felt when
learning whether they would end up in the good situation (with the high income) or in the bad
situation (with the low income).16 They answered this question approximately five minutes
after they had learned what outcome would be relevant for them.17 The experiment was
computerized with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). Sessions lasted around 30 minutes and subjects were on average paid 107
Swedish kronor (around 12.50 US dollars at the time of the experiment).
15In order to keep the expected hourly wage as close as possible across the treatments, subjects in the
Control treatment were paid for answering an additional survey at the end of the session.
16I follow Bosman and van Winden (2002) and let subjects report on a range of emotions and not just the
few (negative) emotions of interest in this study. For a discussion on self-reports as an emotion elicitation
method, see, e.g., Robinson and Clore (2002).
17The exact formulation read as follows: “We will now ask you to describe how you felt at the moment
when you found out which situation would be assigned your group (i.e., right after the experimenter had
tossed the die). Please indicate the intensity of each of the emotions listed below. Please note that there
is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answer.”
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3.3 Hypotheses
The first hypothesis concerns frustration. By (1), a is frustrated when the bad state B obtains
since he realizes that his maximal payoff is less than the payoff he expected at the root of
the game. Therefore, I investigate whether the correlated income shock generates negative
emotions in subjects; i.e., whether those who end up in the bad situation with the low income
in the Simple, Blame-behavior, and Simple-strategy treatments on average experience a higher
intensity of negative emotions than subjects in the good situation (with the high income):
Hypothesis 1. Frustration: Subjects who end up in the bad situation (with the low
income) will report a stronger intensity of negative emotions than subjects who end up
in the good situation (with the high income).
The second hypothesis concerns simple anger, and thus the comparison between the Sim-
ple treatment and the Control treatment. In the Simple treatment, simple anger predicts
full punishment (T = 10) if a is sufficiently prone to anger (θa ≥ 140) whereas anger from
blaming behavior predicts zero punishment.18 In the Control treatment, both simple anger
and anger from blaming behavior predict zero punishment since there is no frustration.
Hypothesis 2. Simple anger : A larger fraction of players a will punish their co-player
b in the Simple treatment than in the Control treatment.
The third hypothesis concerns anger from blaming behavior (could-have-been blame) and
thus comparisons across the Blame-behavior, Simple, and Control treatments. In the Blame-
behavior treatment, simple anger and anger from blaming behavior predictions coincide (full
punishment if sufficiently prone to anger; T = 10),19 whereas only simple anger predicts pun-
ishment in the Simple treatment, and neither simple anger nor anger from blaming behavior
predicts punishment in the Control treatment.
Hypothesis 3. Anger from blaming behavior : A larger fraction of players a will punish
their co-player b in the Blame-behavior treatment than in the Simple treatment, AND
the same fraction of players a will punish their co-player b in the Simple treatment
and the Control treatment.
18There is a simple-anger SE where a chooses full punishment at t = 2 (and at t = 1 he is certain that
he will do so), since by (1) his frustration is Fa = 0.5 · 100 + 0.5 · 0 − 10 = 40 and thus by (2) we have
U(T = 0) ≤ U(T = 10) when 10− θa · 40 · 10 ≤ 0, i.e. when θa ≥ 140 .
19They are identical to the simple-anger prediction in the Simple treatment (punish if θa ≥ 140 ), since
(i) the level of frustration in the bad state B is the same in both treatments, and (ii) with could-have-been
blame a fully blames b for his frustration, since the good state G would have obtained had b made a different
choice.
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The fourth hypothesis concerns a’s plan (at the root of the game) to punish b, should the
frustrating state B occur. Preferences are own-plan dependent and this creates a potential
conflict between a’s plan at the root of the game and his action when potentially frustrated
due to B. In equilibrium, a takes this plan dependence into account (as described on p. 11)
and we expect players a at the root of the game in the Simple-strategy treatment to have the
same goal as a has after the frustrating outcome B in the Simple treatment:
Hypothesis 4. Consistent planning : The same fraction of players a will punish their
co-player b in the Simple treatment and the Simple-strategy treatment.
The fifth and final hypothesis concerns b’s belief about a’s punishment decision, in each
of the four treatments. It is an equilibrium requirement in BDS that players are, at least on
average, correct in their beliefs about other players’ behavior, and this is what we expect to
observe in the experiment:
Hypothesis 5. Belief about others’ punishment : There is no difference between the
fraction of players a who punish and the fraction of players b who expect to be punished
in any of the four treatments.
4 Results
A total of 342 students participated in the experiment. Table 1 displays their participation
in the different parts of the experiment (good or bad situation), which depends on the chance
move and on b’s decision in the Blame-behavior treatment. We can see that 52 subjects in
Table 1: Participation in the different parts of the experiment.
Treatment Sessions Participants Situation Players a who can
Good Bad make a punishment decision
Simple 11 98 46 52 26
Blame-behavior 17 142 84 58 29
Simple-strategy 5 54 26 28 27
Control 7 48 – – 24
Total 40 342 156 138 106
Note: In Simple and Blame-behavior, one player a for every subject-pair (i.e., one a and
one b) who experience the bad situation B can make a punishment decision. For instance,
in Simple, 52 subjects experience the bad situation and out of these, 26 are a player a and
another 26 are a player b. In Simple-strategy, decisions are made before chance determines
whether situation B or G obtains, and thus 27 of the 54 participants will decide as a.
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Simple and 58 subjects in Blame-behavior experience the correlated income shock, and thus
subsequently make decisions in the bad situation (players a decide on punishment and players
b report their expectation). Additionally, in the Simple-strategy treatment, 54 subjects decide
in the same situation but before the chance move, and a further 48 subjects make decisions
in the Control treatment (which is identical except for the income shock). As can be seen in
the table, we have 26, 29, 27, and 24 punishment decisions and an equal amount of reported
expectations in Simple, Blame-behavior, Simple-strategy, and Control, respectively, and we
have 156 subjects who end up in the good situation (with the high income) and 138 subjects
who instead experience the bad situation (with the low income).
First we will analyze subjects’ emotional reactions. In line with Hypothesis 1, we can see
in Table 2 that subjects are more angry and more irritated when hit by the income shock
(the bad situation). The strongest impact is on irritation, with an average intensity of 3.10
within the full sample on a scale ranging from 1 (no emotion at all) to 7 (high intensity of
emotion). This finding is in line with Bosman and van Winden (2002), who also document
substantial irritation (average intensity of 4.05) following a positive take rate in the power-
to-take game.20 This result supports BDS’ conceptualization of frustration as unfulfilled
expectations about material payoffs.
Result 1: The bad situation, where subjects’ maximal income from the experiment is
substantially lower than the ex-ante expected income, generates negative emotions.
Table 2: Average intensity of negative emotions (by situation, G or B).
Anger Irritation
Good Bad P-value Good Bad P-value
Simple (N = 74) 1.29 1.95 < 0.01 1.26 2.73 < 0.01
Blame-behavior (N = 142) 1.12 2.07 < 0.01 1.23 3.21 < 0.01
Simple-strategy (N = 54) 1.04 2.07 < 0.01 1.12 3.43 < 0.01
Note: I use two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests. After the experiment, subjects
were asked to describe the intensity of eleven different emotions (both positive and
negative) felt when learning whether the situation with the high income (good)
or the situation with the low income (bad) would obtain (1 = no emotion at all;
7 = high intensity of emotion). Due to technical problems, 24 subjects could not
answer the question in Simple and thus N = 74.
The correlated income shock thus generates negative emotions and the question is whether
this has a significant effect on subjects’ actions and beliefs, following Hypotheses 2–5. Table 3
20Calculated from Table 2 in Bosman and van Winden (2002) as the average irritation intensity reported
by all 39 responders in the experiment (the take rate was positive for 36 of them).
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displays the fraction of subjects who punish (a) and expect to be punished (b), respectively,
for each of the four treatments.21 We can see that the results are similar across the treatments:
15%–17% of players a chose to punish their co-player, and 24%–37% of players b expected
to be punished. The similarity in behavior across all four treatments indicates the absence
of treatment effects and we verify this in panel A of Table 4. The results for Hypotheses 2–4
are formulated as follows:
Result 2: Subjects do not seem to act in accordance with the simple anger hypothesis
in the context of the experiment. (We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference
in behavior between the two treatments Simple and Control.)
Result 3: Subjects do not seem to act in accordance with the anger from blaming
behavior hypothesis in the context of the experiment. (We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no difference in behavior between the two treatments Blame-behavior
and Simple.)
Result 4: There is no difference between decisions made at the root of the game (about
punishment, should the bad situation occur) and decisions made when the bad situation
has occurred. (We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference in behavior between
the two treatments Simple and Simple-strategy.)
The fifth and final hypothesis concerned subjects’ beliefs about others’ punishment deci-
sions. This issue is investigated by comparing the fraction of players a who punish with the
fraction of players b who expect to be punished. Comparing across columns in Table 3, we
can see that there is a tendency for players b to overshoot in their beliefs about the extent
to which their matched player a will punish them. For instance, in the Simple treatment,
35% of players b thought that they would be punished after the correlated income shock,
but only 15% of players a did so. Looking at the bottom panel of Table 4 we can see that
the difference between punishment behavior and expected punishment behavior is significant
at the 1% level within the full sample (Mann-Whitney U test; p < 0.01, N = 212).
Result 5: Subjects in the experiment do not seem to hold correct beliefs about other
players’ punishment decisions.
Taken together, subjects who end up in the bad situation (with the low income) experience
negative emotions, but this does not seem to affect their behavior to the extent predicted by
the theory. In the context of the experiment, using a minimalistic design and a deliberatively
21The raw data for punishment decisions made by all players a who participated in the experiment can be
found in the Appendix, Table 5.
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weak form of blame attribution, I do not find much support for the simple anger or the anger
from blaming behavior hypothesis.
Table 3: Fraction of subjects who punish and expect to be
punished, respectively.
Punishment Expected
(player a) (player b)
No Yes No Yes
Simple 22 (85%) 4 (15%) 17 (65%) 9 (35%)
Blame-behavior 24 (83%) 5 (17%) 22 (76%) 7 (24%)
Simple-strategy 23 (85%) 4 (15%) 17 (63%) 10 (37%)
Control 20 (83%) 4 (17%) 15 (63%) 9 (37%)
Note: The table displays the fraction of players a who chose
not to punish (T = 0) and punish (T > 0), respectively, and
the fraction of players b who expected their assigned player a
to choose not to punish and punish, respectively.
Table 4: Testing Hypotheses 2–5.
Panel A: Punishment
Null hypothesis P-values
Punish in Simple = Punish in Control 0.90 (N = 50)
Punish in Blame-behavior = Punish in Simple 0.85 (N = 55)
Punish in Simple = Punish in Simple-strategy 0.95 (N = 53)
Panel B: Expectations vs. punishment
Null hypothesis P-values
Punish = Expected, in Simple 0.11 (N = 52)
Punish = Expected, in Blame-behavior 0.52 (N = 58)
Punish = Expected, in Simple-strategy 0.06 (N = 54)
Punish = Expected, in Control 0.11 (N = 48)
Punish = Expected, in all treatments < 0.01 (N = 212)
Note: I use two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests based on proportions
displayed in Table 3.
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5 Conclusion
Anger can be a strong behavioral force, and this has important consequences for human
interaction. I design an experiment that tests the predictions based on central concepts in a
theory of anger developed by Battigalli, Dufwenberg, and Smith (2015; BDS). Specifically, I
test condensed versions of their simple anger and anger from blaming behavior hypotheses in
two-player settings, and I investigate aspects of beliefs and compare subjects’ planned choices
at different stages of the game. The experiment implements a strong and correlated income
shock and subsequently tests whether it generates negative emotions in subjects, whether it
makes them punish their co-players, and whether they punish their co-players when they can
be blamed for the correlated income shock.
The results from the experiment show that the income shock generates negative emotions
in subjects; it makes them angry and irritated. This is in line with BDS, who model frustra-
tion as a result of unfulfilled expectations about material payoffs. However, these negative
emotions do not generally affect punishment decisions to the extent predicted by the theory:
Subjects who experience the correlated income shock (the bad situation) do not punish their
co-player more than subjects who do not experience the income shock, not even when the
co-player can be blamed for the income shock. Thus, in this specific context there is not
much support for the notions of simple anger and anger from blaming behavior.
The focus of the paper is on situations where other-responsibility is weak or nonexistent,
and where there is complete payoff symmetry between the players. Frustration is caused by
chance moves or bad luck rather than harmful actions with blameworthy intent. Focusing on
these aspects seems natural for a first empirical test of the theory, since it isolates the rela-
tively unsophisticated punishment behavior that is the essence of simple anger and that also
seems to be relevant for anger from blaming behavior, as indicated by data from experiments
in Gurdal et al. (2013).
The difference between the results in this study and in Gurdal et al. is interesting. In
their experiment, an agent invests money on behalf of a principal. The agent chooses between
a safe and a risky prospect, and the principal subsequently decides on remuneration for
the agent and a dummy player. They find that agents are blamed and punished for bad
uncontrollable outcomes, since they are paid less (relative to the dummy player) following
bad realizations of the risky prospect. One important contextual difference between Gurdal
et al. and the Blame-behavior treatment in the present paper is that the agents in Gurdal et
al. do have some ex-ante control over the outcome, in their choice between the safe and the
risky prospect, even though they are punished for the bad realization of the risky prospect,
which they cannot control. This makes the agent’s role in the bad outcome more salient and
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perhaps this is why anger from blaming behavior seems to be more relevant in this context.
Having some form of choice, even if irrelevant, possibly affects how one’s responsibility for a
bad outcome is evaluated.22
Another important aspect of the design is that payoffs are symmetric, which allows for
testing the theory in isolation of distributional concerns. However, maybe the influence of
frustration and anger would be stronger in contexts with asymmetric payoffs. For example,
disastrous income shocks caused by catastrophic events such as extreme weather or natural
disasters might well make people angry, but maybe they are more likely to be angry with
people who had the means and economic privileges to prevent or limit personal damage rather
than with people who also were badly affected by these events. An interesting extension is
thus to test the theory in a context where there is payoff inequality, implemented by chance
or by other players in the experiment.
Anger and frustration may shape economic outcomes in profound ways. Angry individuals
become hostile in their dealings with others and this has strategic consequences. BDS provide
a rich framework for theoretical analysis and I have provided a first test of empirical relevance.
There are several interesting avenues for future research.
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Appendix A: Additional data
Table 5: All punishment decisions in the experiment (by treatment).
Punishment Simple Blame-behavior Simple-strategy Control
(player a) (Frequency) (Frequency) (Frequency) (Frequency)
0 22 24 23 20
1 0 1 0 1
2 3 0 2 0
3 0 1 0 1
4 0 1 0 1
5 0 2 0 0
6 0 0 1 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0
10 1 0 1 0
Total (N) 26 29 27 24
Average punishment 0.62 0.62 0.74 0.67
Appendix B: Instructions for the Simple treatment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the SEK 50
you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money that you earn with
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These
instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate
during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and
all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you. We will
only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
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of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1 SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this person,
not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you will never find
out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are a
participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you and
your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a group
number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign your
group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die.
• If your group number is an even number (2, 4, 6, 8 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an even number (2, 4 or 6) and situation 2 will be assigned
if the thrown number is an odd number (1, 3 or 5).
• If your group number is an odd number (1, 3, 5, 7 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned if
the thrown number is also an odd number (1, 3 or 5) and situation 2 will be assigned
if the thrown number is an even number (2, 4 or 6).
This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situation
will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
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Example 1: If your group number is 8 (an even number) and the number on the die is 4 (also
an even number), then situation 1 is assigned.
Example 2: If your group number is 4 (an even number) and the number on the die is 3 (an
odd number), then situation 2 is assigned.
Example 3: If your group number is 3 (an odd number) and the number on the die is 1 (also
an odd number), then situation 1 is assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and
participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up
to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will cost
you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct 0
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to estimate
the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will be paid
for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right, you will get
5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment. If your estimate
is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
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• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
1. The experiment begins. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2. The
experimenter will toss the die and one randomly selected participant will verify the outcome.
Together they will enter the number on this participant’s computer screen.
2a. If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and par-
ticipant B’s income is 100 points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.
2b. If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a
total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point you deduct will cost you one point.
Once you have made your decision, the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus
the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant B’s income is
10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her. You will receive
payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 2b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, participant
A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point deducted
will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or she will deduct
from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has made his or her
decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this amount correctly, and
participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) he or she deducted from
you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
Appendix C: Instructions for the Blame-behavior treat-
ment
General instructions for participant A
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Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the SEK 50
you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money that you earn with
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These
instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate
during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and
all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you. We will
only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1 SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this person,
not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you will never find
out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are a
participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you and
your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a group
number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
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At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign your
group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die. Before the exper-
imenter tosses the die, your participant B will guess whether the thrown number will be
even (2, 4 or 6) or odd (1, 3 or 5).
• If the guess is correct, situation 1 will be assigned.
• If the guess is wrong, situation 2 will be assigned.
This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situation
will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
Example 1: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be even, and the
number on the die is 4 (also an even number so the guess was correct), then situation 1 is
assigned.
Example 2: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be even, and the
number on the die is 3 (an odd number so the guess was wrong), then situation 2 is assigned.
Example 3: If your participant B guessed that the thrown number would be odd, and the
number on the die is 1 (also an odd number so the guess was right), then situation 1 is
assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and
participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up
to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will cost
you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
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Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct 0
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to estimate
the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will be paid
for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right, you will get
5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment. If your estimate
is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
1. The experiment begins. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2. Your
participant B will guess whether the thrown number will be even or odd and the guess will be
reported to you (on your computer screen). Then the experimenter will toss the die and one
randomly selected participant will verify the outcome. Together they will enter the number
on this participant’s computer screen.
2a. If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and par-
ticipant B’s income is 100 points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.
2b. If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a
total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point you deduct will cost you one point.
Once you have made your decision, the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus
the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant B’s income is
10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her. You will receive
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payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 2b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, participant
A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point deducted
will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or she will deduct
from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has made his or her
decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this amount correctly, and
participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) he or she deducted from
you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
Appendix D: Instructions for the Simple-strategy treat-
ment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the SEK 50
you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money that you earn with
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These
instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate
during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and
all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you. We will
only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1 SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
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The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this person,
not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you will never find
out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are a
participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B. We will refer to you and
your participant B as a group and each group will be assigned a specific number (a group
number).
There are two possible situations in the experiment:
• In situation 1, you receive 100 points and participant B receives 100 points.
• In situation 2, you receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points.
At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter will randomly assign your
group either situation 1 or situation 2 by tossing a 6-sided die.
• If your group number is an even number (2, 4, 6, 8 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned
if the thrown number is also an even number (2, 4 or 6) and situation 2 will be assigned
if the thrown number is an odd number (1, 3 or 5).
• If your group number is an odd number (1, 3, 5, 7 etc.): situation 1 will be assigned if
the thrown number is also an odd number (1, 3 or 5) and situation 2 will be assigned
if the thrown number is an even number (2, 4 or 6).
This means that situation 1 and situation 2 are equally likely to be assigned (each situation
will be assigned with a probability of 50%).
Example 1: If your group number is 8 (an even number) and the number on the die is 4 (also
an even number), then situation 1 is assigned.
Example 2: If your group number is 4 (an even number) and the number on the die is 3 (an
odd number), then situation 2 is assigned.
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Example 3: If your group number is 3 (an odd number) and the number on the die is 1 (also
an odd number), then situation 1 is assigned.
If situation 1 is assigned, the experiment is over. Your income is 100 points and
participant B’ income is 100 points.
If situation 2 is assigned, as participant A you have the possibility to deduct up
to a total of 10 points from your participant B. Each point deducted will cost
you one point. When you have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: Situation 2 is assigned and you (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct 0
points from your participant B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: In situation 2 you will be asked to estimate
the number of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will be paid
for the accuracy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right, you will get
5 points in addition to your other income from the experiment. If your estimate
is not exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
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We will ask you to make your choice (how many points to deduct if situation 2 is
assigned) before your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2 (by
the experimenter tossing the die). If situation 2 is assigned, your choice will be
implemented (and if situation 1 is assigned your income will be 100 points and
participant B’s income 100 points regardless of the choice you made).
Example 1: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your participant
B in case situation 2 is assigned. It is then randomly determined that situation 1 will apply
(your choice is not implemented). The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 100.
• Participant B’s points: 100.
Example 2: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your participant
B in case situation 2 is assigned. It is then randomly determined that situation 2 will apply
(your choice is implemented). The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Procedures in chronological order
1. The experiment begins. As participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a
total of 10 points from your participant B if situation 2 is assigned. Each point you deduct
will cost you one point. You will make your choice now and it will be implemented if it is
randomly determined that situation 2 will apply.
2. Your group is randomly assigned situation 1 or situation 2. The experimenter will toss
the die and one randomly selected participant will verify the outcome. Together they will
enter the number on this participant’s computer screen.
3a. If situation 1 is assigned, your income is 100 points and participant B’s income is 100
points. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
3b. If situation 2 is assigned, your choice will be implemented. Your income is 10 points
minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from participant B, and participant B’s income
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is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted from him or her. You will receive
payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, 3b instead reads: If situation 2 is assigned, your choice
will be implemented. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) participant
A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this amount correctly, and participant
A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) he or she deducted from you. You
will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
Appendix E: Instructions for the Control treatment
General instructions for participant A
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for participating!
Please do not talk to other participants.
You are about to take part in an economics experiment. If you read the following instructions
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions – earn money in addition to the SEK 50
you will receive for being part of the experiment. The amount of money that you earn with
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. These
instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to communicate
during the experiment. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and
all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you. We will
only answer your questions in private.
We will not speak in terms of Swedish kronor during the experiment, but rather of points.
Your income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the total amount
of points earned will be converted to kronor at the following rate: 1 point = 1 SEK.
We will explain the exact experimental procedure on the next few pages.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with one
other participant in the experiment. You will never find out the identity of this person,
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not even after the experiment. In the same way, the person matched with you will never find
out your identity.
There are two types of participants in this experiment: participants A and B. You are a
participant A. The person matched with you is a participant B.
At the beginning of the experiment, you receive 10 points and participant B re-
ceives 10 points.
As participant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points
from your participant B. Each point deducted will cost you one point. When you
have made your choice, the experiment is over.
Example 1: You (as participant A) give up 4 points to deduct 4 points from your participant
B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 4 = 6.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 4 = 6.
Example 2: You (as participant A) give up 0 points to deduct 0 points from your participant
B. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant A): 10− 0 = 10.
• Participant B’s points: 10− 0 = 10.
[Only in the instructions for participant B: You will be asked to estimate the number
of points your participant A will deduct from you. You will be paid for the ac-
curacy of your estimate: If your estimate is exactly right, you will get 5 points
in addition to your other income from the experiment. If your estimate is not
exactly right, you will not get any additional points.
Example 1: You estimate that your participant A will deduct 4 points from you and this
estimate is correct. The following payment will then result:
• Your points (as participant B): 10− 4 + 5 = 11.
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• Participant A’s points: 10− 4 = 6.]
Procedures in chronological order
The experiment begins. You receive 10 points and participant B receives 10 points. As par-
ticipant A you have the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from your participant
B. Each point you deduct will cost you one point. Once you have made your decision, the
experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) you deducted
from participant B, and participant B’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
you deducted from him or her. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your
show-up fee in cash.
[In the instructions for participant B, the above paragraph is replaced by the following: The
experiment begins. You receive 10 points and participant A receives 10 points. Participant
A has the possibility to deduct up to a total of 10 points from you. Each point deducted
will cost him or her one point. You will estimate the number of points he or she will deduct
from you. Once you have made your decision (and your participant A has made his or her
decision), the experiment is over. Your income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything)
participant A deducted from you plus 5 points if you estimated this amount correctly, and
participant A’s income is 10 points minus the amount (if anything) he or she deducted from
you. You will receive payment for the points earned plus your show-up fee in cash.]
Do you have any questions?
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